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Abstract
The concede-and-divide rule is a basic solution for bankruptcy problems with two claimants.
An extension of the concede-and-divide rule to bankruptcy problems with more than two
claimants is provided. This extension not only uses the concede-and-divide principle in its
procedural definition, but also preserves the main properties of the concede-and-divide rule.
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Bankruptcy problems are first treated within the framework of interactive allocation problems in
O’Neill (1982). In a bankruptcy problem a certain amount of money, the estate, has to be divided
among a group of claimants. The amount claimed is larger than the estate, which gives rise to the
problem of a fair division of the estate, satisfactory to all claimants. Many solutions for bankruptcy
problems have been proposed in literature. An overview of bankruptcy rules and their properties
can be found in Thomson (2003).
In a bankruptcy situation with only two claimants, e.g. the run-to-the-bank rule (cf. O’Neill
(1982)), the Talmud rule (cf. Aumann and Maschler (1985)) and the adjusted proportional rule (cf.
Curiel, Maschler, and Tijs (1988)) coincide. Thomson (2003) refers to this basic or standard rule as
the concede-and-divide rule. It is based on the idea that each claimant concedes the amount of the
estate that is not claimed by himself to the other claimant. This amount can be seen as a minimal
right of a claimant. Subsequently, the amount left of the estate after giving both claimants their
minimal rights is divided equally. Dagan (1996) provides several characterisations of the concede-
and-divide rule using the properties self-duality, minimal right first and invariance under claim
truncation. Another characterization can be found in Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2004) using
among others the property of lower securement. The idea behind the concede-and-divide rule is
appealing, but is it has never been extended to bankruptcy problems with more than two claimants.
In this paper we provide such an extension of the concede-and-divide rule. This extension is
inspired by the extension of the standard solution of two person cooperative games to a solution of
cooperative games with an arbitrary finite set of players provided by Ju, Borm, and Ruys (2004).
The underlying idea is that claimants leave the group one by one in a specific (but random) order.
At each moment a claimant leaves the (remaining) group, he receives a part of the estate that is
left at that stage. The amount he gets is based on the concede-and-divide rule for a two person
bankruptcy situation in which he is seen as one claimant and the rest of the group together as the
other. In this way the concede-and-divide principle is applied recursively. Taking the average over
all possible orders, one then obtains the concede-and-divide allocation. Alternatively the concede-
and divide allocation can be seen as the result of the following procedure. Suppose there is a bank
that manages the estate, which knows the total amount of the claims. The bank however is ignorant
about the exact number of claimants. Now the claimants arrive in a specific (but random) order
at the bank. So at the time a specific claimant arrives, the bank only knows the remaining estate,
the claim of the present claimant and the total claims of the possible claimants that are to arrive
in future. Therefore, at that instance, an application of the concede-and-divide principle seems
natural.
In section 2 the formal definition of the extended concede-and-divide rule for bankruptcy prob-
lems with more than two claimants is introduced. Furthermore a recursive formula is provided. In
section 3 it is shown that this extension preserves the main properties of the concede-and divide
rule.
2 The concede-and-divide rule
This section formally introduces a concede-and-divide rule for arbitrary bankruptcy problems.
A bankruptcy problem consists of a triple (N, E, c), where E is the estate that has to be divided
among a finite set of claimants N , and c ∈ RN , c ≥ 0 is a vector of claims. By the nature of a
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bankruptcy problem we assume that E ≤ ∑i∈N ci. The class of all bankruptcy problems is denoted
by C. Let (N, E, c) ∈ C and S ⊂ N . Then the part of E that is not claimed by N\S can be seen
as a right of coalition S and is denoted by




A function f on C is a bankruptcy rule if for all bankruptcy problems (N, E, c), f(N, E, c) ∈ RN ,
0 ≤ fi(N, E, c) ≤ ci for all i ∈ N and
∑
i∈N fi(N, E, c) = E. An overview of bankruptcy rules
proposed in the literature is found in Thomson (2003).
The concede-and-divide rule (cf. Thomson (2003)), denoted by CD, is only defined for bankruptcy
problems with two claimants. Let |N | = 2, N = {i, j} and (N,E, c) ∈ C. Then
CDi(N, E, c) = max{E − cj , 0}+ E −max{E − cj , 0} −max{E − ci, 0}2 ,
or alternatively
CDi(N, E, c) = r{i}(N, E, c) +
E − r{i}(N, E, c)− r{j}(N, E, c)
2
.
The concede-and-divide rule first gives each claimant that part of the estate that is not claimed by
the other. Subsequently the remaining estate is equally divided among both claimants. In the case
that |N | = 2, the concede-and-divide rule can be seen as the standard solution.
We now introduce an extension of the concede-and-divide rule. This extended rule is applicable
to arbitrary bankruptcy problems and respects the concede-and-divide principle in its procedural
definition. The underlying idea is that claimants leave the group one by one in a specific (but
random) order. If a claimant leaves the group he receives a part of the estate. The amount given
to him is based on the concede-and-divide rule for bankruptcy problems with two claimants. He
himself is seen as one claimant, while the rest of the group together is viewed as the other. The
part that is distributed to the the rest of the group acts as the new estate in the following step,
when the next claimant is leaving. Taking the average over all possible orders, one obtains the
concede-and-divide allocation.
An order of N is a bijective function σ : {1, . . . , |N |} → N . The claimant at position k in the
order σ is denoted by σ(k). The set of all orders of N is denoted by Π(N).
Let σ ∈ Π(N). This order is interpreted as the order in which claimants are leaving with a
certain amount of the estate. This results in a vector sσ(N,E, c). Formally the vector sσ(N, E, c)
is defined as follows: let k ∈ {1, . . . , |N |}. Then
sσσ(k)(N, E, c) = rσ(k)(M
k, Ek, dk) +
E−rσ(k)(Mk,Ek,dk)−rMk\{σ(k)}(Mk,Ek,dk)
2 ,
here Mk = {σ(k), . . . , σ(|N |)}, dk ∈ RMk is the restriction of the vector c to the claimants in Mk
and E1 = E, Ek = Ek−1 − CDσσ(k−1)(E, c) (2 ≤ k ≤ |N |).
The concede-and-divide rule for general bankruptcy problems averages between all possible orders.





for all i ∈ N and all (N,E, c) ∈ C.
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Note that in case |N | = 2, both orders σ1 = (12) and σ2 = (21) give rise to the same allocation.
Consequently, one readily verifies that the concede-and-divide rule, as defined above, is indeed an
extension of the concede-and-divide rule for two claimant bankruptcy situations.
Example 2.1 Let N = {1, 2, 3}, E = 12 and c = (4, 6, 8). Consider the order σ = (123). Then
claimant 1 is the first claimant who leaves the group. Claimant 2 and 3 together have a total claim
of 14. The minimal right of claimant 1 equals 0, and claimant 2 and 3 have together a minimal right
of E − c1 = 8. Claimant 1 receives 0 + E−0−82 = 2. Now claimant 2 is leaving and the remaining
estate equals 12 − 2 = 10. The minimal right of claimant 2 and 3 equal r{2}({2, 3}, 10, (6, 8)) = 2
and r{3}({2, 3}, 10, (6, 8)) = 4, respectively. Hence claimant 2 leaves with 2 + 10−2−42 = 4 and
claimant 3 receives 4 + 10−4−22 = 6. This yields that s
σ(N, E, c) = (2, 4, 6).
All vectors sσ(N, E, c), σ ∈ Π(N) are given in the table below.
σ sσ(N, E, c)
(123) (2, 4, 6)
(132) (2, 4, 6)
(213) (212 , 3, 6
1
2)
(231) (212 , 3, 6
1
2)
(312) (212 , 4
1
2 , 5)




CD(N,E, c) = 16
∑
σ∈Π(N)
sσ(N, E, c) = 16(14, 23, 39).
The approach used to define the concede-and-divide rule for arbitrary situations is inspired by
Ju et al. (2004), where the standard solution for a two-person game is extended to a solution
(the consensus value) for arbitrary cooperative games1. The following lemma provides a recursive
formula for the concede-and-divide rule.
Lemma 2.1 Let (N,E, c) ∈ C. Then for all i ∈ N
CDi(N, E, c) = 1|N |
(









CDi(N\{j}, E−j , c−j)
)
where E−j is the amount that is left of the estate if claimant j is the first one to leave, i.e.,
E−j = E − r{j}(N, E, c)−
E − r{j}(N, e, c)− rN\{j}(N,E, c)
2
and c−j ∈ RN\{j} denotes the claim vector c, in which the claim of j is omitted.
By means of Lemma 2.1 it readily follows (by induction) that 0 ≤ CD(N, E, c) ≤ c.
1The concede-and-divide allocation of a bankruptcy problem generally does not equal the consensus value of
the corresponding bankruptcy game. In fact the last approach does not determine a bankruptcy rule. Consider the
bankruptcy situation (N, E, c) = ({1, 2, 3}, 100, (60, 60, 1). Then the consensus value of the corresponding bankruptcy








3 Properties of the concede-and-divide rule
In this section we analyze some general properties of the concede-and-divide rule.
First we derive an explicit formula for the concede-and-divide rule if the bankruptcy situation
is a small claims situation. Let (N, E, c) ∈ C. Then (N, E, c) is a small claims situation if for
all i ∈ N , ∑j∈N\{i} cj ≤ E. In a small claims situation (N, E, c) the Talmud rule, the run-to-




j∈N cj) + ci. The following theorem shows that in a small claims situation the concede-
and-divide rule prescribes the same allocation.
Theorem 3.1 Let (N, E, c) ∈ C be a small claims situation. Then





cj) + ci (1)
for all i ∈ N .
Proof: The proof is given by an induction argument on the number of claimants, using the recursive
formula of Lemma 2.1.
Let |N | = 2. Then (N, E, c) is a small claims situation if c1 ≤ E and c2 ≤ E. It follows that
CD1(N,E, c) = E − c2 + E−(E−c2)−(E−c1)2 = 12(E − c1 − c2) + c1
and
CD2(N,E, c) = E − c1 + E−(E−c1)−(E−c2)2 = 12(E − c2 − c1) + c2.
Let k ∈ N. Assume that for all small claims situations with |N | ≤ k, equation (1) is valid for all
i ∈ N . Denote ∑j∈N cj by C. Let (N,E, c) ∈ C be a small claims situation such that |N | = k + 1
and let i ∈ N . According to Lemma 2.1, combined with the fact that we have a small claims
situation, we have
CDi(N, E, c) = 1|N |
(
1





CDi(N\{j}, E−j , c−j),
where
E−j = E − (E −
∑
`∈N\{j}
c`)− 12(E − (E −
∑
`∈N\{j}




for all j ∈ N\{i}.




c` = 12E +
1







c`) + 12cm ≥ 0.
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Hence (N\{j}, E−j , c−j) is a small claims situation. Since |N\{j}| = k, the induction hypothesis
implies
CDi(N, E, c) = 1|N |
(
1

































2(E − C) + (|N | − 1)ci)
= 1|N |(E − C) + ci.
¤
The concede-and-divide rule satisfies the properties of homogeneity, resource monotonicity, claims
monotonicity and equal treatment of equals. The proof is rather straightforward (by induction) and
is left to the reader. We now recall the definitions of three properties that are used to characterize
the concede-and-divide rule in the two claimant case. Let f be a bankruptcy rule. The rule f is
invariant under claims truncation if for all (N,E, c) ∈ C, we have f(N, E, c) = f(N,E, c̄), where
c̄ ∈ RN is the truncated claim vector, i.e., c̄i = min{E, ci} for all i ∈ N . The bankruptcy rule f is
self-dual if for all (N, E, c) ∈ C, we have f(N,E, c) = c− f(N,∑j∈N cj −E, c). The rule f satisfies
minimal rights first if for all (N,E, c) ∈ C, we have f(N, E, c) = r + f(N, E − ∑j∈N rj , c − r),
where r ∈ RN is the minimal right vector, i.e., ri = r{i}(N, E, c) for all i ∈ N .
Theorem 3.2 (cf. Dagan (1996)) The concede-and-divide rule is the only rule on bankruptcy
situations with two claimants satisfying
(i) invariance under claims truncation and self-duality;
or, alternatively,
(ii) minimal rights first and self-duality.
The next theorem proves that the extended concede-and-divide rule still satisfies these three prop-
erties on the domain of all bankruptcy situations.
Theorem 3.3 The concede-and-divide rule satisfies invariance under claims truncation, self-duality
and minimal rights first.
Proof: (1) Invariance under claims truncation. The proof is given by an induction argument. Let
|N | = 2. Since the extension of the concede-and-divide rule coincides with the original concede-
and-divide rule in the two claimants case, it follows by Theorem 3.2 that the concede-and-divide
rule satisfies truncation.
Let k ∈ N, k ≥ 2. Assume that for all bankruptcy situations (N, E, c) such that |N | ≤ k the
concede-and-divide rule satisfies invariance under claims truncation. Let N be such that |N | = k+1
and let (N, E, c) be a bankruptcy situation. Then for all S ⊂ N ,
rS(N, E, c) = max{E −
∑
j∈N\S
cj , 0} = max{E −
∑
j∈N\S
c̄j , 0} = rS(N, E, c̄).
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Let j ∈ N and let c̃ ∈ RN\{j} be defined as c̃i = min{E−j , ci} for all i ∈ N\{j}. Then c̃i =
min{E−j , c̄i}. Using the induction hypothesis twice we find that
CD(N\{j}, E−j , c−j) = CD(N\{j}, E−j , c̃−j) = CD(N\{j}, E−j , c̄−j).
Using the above observations, the recursive formula of Lemma 2.1 directly implies that CD(N,E, c) =
CD(N,E, c̄).
(2) Self-duality. First note that it is sufficient to prove that for all σ ∈ Π(N) and all (N, E, c) we
have that
sσ(N, E, c) = c− sσ(N,
∑
j∈N
cj − E, c). (2)
For |N | = 2, this is obvious by Theorem 3.2. Let k ∈ N, k ≥ 2. Assume that for all bankruptcy
situations (N, E, c) such that |N | ≤ k and all σ ∈ Π(N), formula (2) is satisfied. Let N be such
that |N | = k + 1. Take (N, E, c) ∈ C and σ ∈ Π(N). Denote ∑j∈N cj by C. We first prove that
sσσ(1)(N, E, c) + s
σ
σ(1)(N,C −E, c) = cσ(1). (3)
Since σ(1) is the first claimant that leaves the group





cj , 0}+ 12(E −max{E − cσ(1), 0}), (4)
and
sσσ(1)(N, C − E, c) = 12 max{C −E −
∑
j∈N\{σ(1)}
cj , 0}+ 12(C − E −max{C −E − cσ(1), 0}
= 12 max{cσ(1) − E, 0}+ 12(C − E −max{
∑
j∈N\{σ(1)}





cj , 0} −max{
∑
j∈N\{σ(1)}





max{cσ(1) − E, 0} −max{E − cσ(1), 0} = cσ(1) −E.
Adding equations (4) and (5) yields
sσσ(1)(N, E, c) + s
σ
σ(1)(N,C −E, c) = 12(cσ(1) −E)− 12(
∑
j∈N\{σ(1)}
cj −E) + 12C = cσ(1).
E−σ(1) is the amount that is left of E, if σ(1) has first left the group in the bankruptcy situation
(N, E, c) and similarly (C −E)−σ(1) is the amount that is left of E, if σ(1) has first left the group
in the bankruptcy situation (N,C −E, c). From equation (3) it follows that
E−σ(1) + (C − E)−σ(1) = C − cσ(1). (6)
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Let σ̄ ∈ Π(N\{σ(1)}) be the order of all other claimants that is prescribed by σ. Let i ∈ N\{σ(1)}.
Then
sσi (N,E, c) = s
σ̄
i (N\{σ(1)}, E−σ(1), c−σ(1))
ind.= ci − sσ̄i (N\{σ(1)},
∑
j∈N\{σ(1)}
cj − E−σ(1), c−σ(1))
(6)
= ci − sσ̄i (N\{σ(1)}, (C −E)−σ(1), c−σ(1))
= ci − sσi (N, C − E, c).
(3) Minimal roghts first. Note that it is sufficient to prove that for all (N, E, c) and all σ ∈ Π(N)
we have that
sσ(N, E, c) = r + sσ(N, E −
∑
j∈N
rj , c− r). (7)
For |N | = 2, this is obvious by Theorem 3.2. Let k ∈ N, k ≥ 2. Assume that for all bankruptcy
situations (N, E, c) such that |N | ≤ k and for all σ ∈ Π(N), formula (7) is satisfied. Let N be
such that |N | = k + 1 and let (N, E, c) ∈ C, σ ∈ Π(N). Recall that ri = r{i}(N, E, c) and define
R =
∑
j∈N rj . We first prove that
sσσ(1)(N, E, c) = rσ(1) + s
σ
σ(1)(N,E −R, c− r). (8)
Now,
sσσ(1)(N,E, c) = rσ(1) +
1
2(E − rσ(1) −max{E − cσ(1), 0})
= rσ(1) + 12 min{cσ(1) − rσ(1), E − rσ(1)}, (9)
and, since r{`}(N, E −R, c− r) = 0 for all ` ∈ N ,
rσ(1) + s
σ
σ(1)(N, E −R, c− r) = rσ(1) + 12(E −R−max{E −R− (cσ(1) − rσ(1)), 0})
= rσ(1) + 12 min{cσ(1) − rσ(1), E −R}. (10)
There are two cases. First if rj = 0 for all j ∈ N\{σ(1)}, then trivially (9) and (10) are equal.
Secondly suppose there is a j ∈ N\{σ(1)} such that rj > 0. Then cσ(1) < E and rj = E −∑
`∈N\{j} c` ≤ E −
∑
`∈N\{σ(1),j} r` − cσ(1) indicating that cσ(1) − rσ(1) ≤ E −R and hence cσ(1) −
rσ(1) ≤ E − rσ(1). So also in this case (9) and (10) are equal, and (8) is established.
From (8) and the definition of E−σ(1) and (E −R)−σ(1), it can be concluded that
E−σ(1) −R = (E −R)−σ(1) − rσ(1) (11)
Next define r̃ ∈ RN\{σ(1)} by r̃` = r{`}(N\{σ(1)}, E−σ(1), c−σ(1)) for all ` ∈ N\{σ(1)} and denote
R̃ =
∑
`∈N\{σ(1)} r̃`. Note that r̃i ≥ ri, since E−σ(1) ≥ E − cσ(1). Let σ̄ ∈ Π(N\σ(1)) be the order
of all other claimants that is prescribed by σ. Let i ∈ N\{σ(1)}. Using the induction hypothesis
sσi (N,E, c) = s
σ̄
i (N\{σ(1)}, E−σ(1), c−σ(1))
= r̃i + sσ̄i (N\{σ(1)}, E−σ(1) − R̃, c−σ(1) − r̃).
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On the other hand
ri + sσi (N, E −R, c− r) = ri + sσ̄i (N\{σ(1)}, (E −R)−σ(1), (c− r)−σ(1))
(11)
= ri + sσ̄i (N\{σ(1)}, E−σ(1) −R + rσ(1), (c− r)−σ(1)). (12)
Since |N\{σ(1)}| = k, we can apply the induction hypothesis to the bankruptcy situation in (12).
For this we first calculate the minimal right r̄` of a claimant ` ∈ N\{σ(1)} in the bankruptcy
situation (N\{σ(1)}, E−σ(1) −R + rσ(1), (c− r)−σ(1)).
r̄` = max{E−σ(1) −R + rσ(1) −
∑
j∈N\{`,σ(1)}
(cj − rj), 0}







cj , r`} − r`
= r̃` − r`
The last equality follows since r̃` ≥ r`. It follows from (12) and the induction hypothesis that
ri + sσi (N,E −R, c− r)
= ri + r̄i + sσ̄i (N\{σ(1)}, E−σ(1) −R + rσ(1) −
∑
`∈N\{σ(1)}
r̄`, (c− r)−σ(1) − r̄)
= r̃i + sσ̄i (N\{σ(1)}, E−σ(1) − R̃, c−σ(1) − r̃).
¤
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